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Criminal Law Practitioner
BODY WORN CAMERAS WITH FACIAL RECOGNITION
TECHNOLOGY: WHEN IT CONSTITUTES A SEARCH
Kelly Blount
Hadi Partovi, a board member at Taser recently told Bloomberg Business Week that "Taser
wants to be the Tesla or Apple of law enforcement."' The switch to a more technology-oriented
product base was developed in response to public outcry over a series of deaths resulting from the
electrical impulses emitted by the 'taser.' 2 Subsequently, Taser released a camera that switched on
when a police officer activated his taser. In creating a record of any interaction where the taser is
used, officers are accountable for their actions as well as protected against any accusations of mis-
conduct where fallacious. In addition to the practical consequences of camera technology, Taser
has reported that in the first quarter of 2016 the company's revenue was higher for camera and
cloud services than for weaponry for the first time ever.
Similarly, after a series of fatal police shootings of unarmed African American men across the
United States, the Department of Justice funded a program that subsidized body worn police camer-
as for police officers. A recent survey found that as of 2014, twenty-five percent of the nation's police
officers were already wearing the body cameras. The body cameras were being used in addition to
squad car-mounted cameras. The purpose of body cameras is to hold police officers accountable for
any acts of misconduct. Similarly, the cameras are meant to protect the officer and in theory should
encourage both parties to a police-citizen interaction to behave in accordance with the knowledge
they will be held accountable.' Though little research exists on the subject to date, some studies have
suggested that body worn cameras decrease excessive force by police officers and decrease alterca-
tions with citizens. 6
There have been legal arguments both for and against the widespread use of body cameras,
including the effect that they may have on First Amendment rights and personal privacy. How-
ever, on the whole, they have been considered a positive development in policing by both police
departments and the public.' As the technology continues to advance and companies continue to
compete for top selling iterations of the product, constitutional issues have begun to emerge. This
paper will specifically discuss the development of body cameras equipped with facial recognition
Karen Weise, Willa Camera on Every Cop Make Everyone Safer? Taser Thinks So, BLOOMBERG BUSINESS WEEK (July 12,
2016).
2 See id.
See id. (noting that the company reported that for cameras and cloud services reached $52 million in bookings
for future revenue).
4 See Michael D.White,Police Officer Body- Worn Cameras; Assessing the Evidence, WASHINGTON D.C. OFFICE OF COM-
MUNITY ORIENTED POLICING SERVICES (2014).
' See Jonathan Young,LocalLaw EnforcementPlansfor Body Cameras, STILLWATER GAZETTE (Dec. 16, 2016). In ad-
dition to causing fallacious complaints against officers to go down, may also encourage more positive interactions
generally. One police officer in Oak Park Heights, Minnesota reported that once a citizen learned the officer had
recorded their interaction, he subsequently dropped a complaint against him.
6 See Scientific Am., Cities Want Cops to Wear Cameras, but Technology Could Heighten Distrust ifNot Carefully Used,
SCIENTIFIC Am. (Dec. 1, 2014).
See Jay Stanley, Police Body-Mounted Cameras: With Right Policies in Place, a Win For AllAmerican CivilLiberties
Union (Mar. 2015).
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technology. Facial recognition technology is a frequently used and generally accepted technology;
however, the implications of applying it to real-time police work by linking the capability to body
worn cameras has sparked debate over possible violations of the Fourth Amendment. Because this
combined technology is still in its nascent stages, this paper will suggest various ways in which
this technology may be constitutionally permissible, as well as applications that may render its use
unconstitutional.
The paper will begin with a brief survey of the technological landscape, namely the compa-
ny players and their progress in developing this combination of technologies. The discussion will
broadly explain the function and process of facial recognition technology and how it may be used
in conjunction with body worn cameras. This section will also outline the process by which a facial
scan is searched against a database.
Next, the paper will investigate policies that are currently in place regarding the use of body
worn cameras as well as scant regulations regarding facial recognition technology. The section will
suggest that the lack of stand-alone regulation of these two products leaves a large space for abuse
and misuse of the technologies if combined. The paper will argue that lack of regulation at the
federal level requires the judicial system to set the standard by which constitutional issues that
arise with the use of enhanced law enforcement technology will be evaluated. Further, the gener-
ally unregulated nature of the products also de-centralizes the means by which processes are de-
veloped and gathered information is maintained. The discussion will suggest that the technology
will remain governed by local and state policy, which could result in the application of dispersed
legal frameworks.
The third section of the paper will suggest ways in which integrating body worn cameras
and facial recognition technology might be used under the auspices of a Fourth Amendment legal
search. Because the technology is still being developed, the discussion will address different uses
of the technology that may affect its legality or may constitute a search. In recent years, the scope
of Fourth Amendment analysis has been slowly transitioning from the physical world to the more
technologically networked world. This section will argue that such a product will link the physical
and theoretical spaces of property, and significantly complicate the way that courts will rule on
these issues in the future. This section then applies several standards which courts may use to
evaluate the use of the technology.
Lastly, the paper will make recommendations on the potential benefits and drawbacks of
linking facial recognition technology to body worn police cameras. While regulation will likely
remain fractured by jurisdiction for the foreseeable future, it is still imperative that the constitu-
tional bounds of the technology are established. Not only will this be necessary in crafting policy
surrounding its use, it is also likely to be the subject of future litigation and relevant to countless
searches and arrests.
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TECHNOLOGY
Paris 1887: Social anthropologist Mr.
Alphonse Bertillon developed a facial recogni-
tion methodology, the same procedure which
constitutes the basis for our current technolo-
gy, now digitized and automated.' Mr. Bertillon
catalogued arrested criminals by taking precise
measurements of a person's standard features
such as ears, nose and mouth, and document-
ing any distinctive features such as scars and
birthmarks.9 Next, the collected data with the
arrestee's name and charges was noted on a
card with a photo, giving rise to the mug shot.' 0
The cards were often circulated among cities
where the person may wander, giving police
a veritable, albeit physical, database of locally
known criminals." Aside from the mug shot of
a falsely accused person who was arrested and
booked, there is no evidence to suggest that law
enforcement was maintaining a record of per-
sons who committed no crime or ever encoun-
tered a police officer. In addition, the mug shots
were ostensibly used only after a crime had
been committed. Courts in the early twentieth
century held that it was a responsible police
technique to utilize photographic technologies
' See U.S. Nat'l Library of Medicine, https://www.nlm.
nih.gov/visibleproofs/galleries/biographies/bertillon.
html (last accessed Apr. 30, 2017).
* See id.
10 See Defense of the Bertillon System, New York Times,
(Jan. 20, 1896); Maryland c. King, 133 S.Ct. 1958 (2013)
(holding that DNA samples taken incident to arrest is
not a violation of the Fourth Amendment.).
" See Jennifer Tucker, How FacialRecognition Technol-
ogy Came To Be; The FBI's Astonishing New Identfication
System is the Product of 175 years ofInnocation and Para-
noia. A VisualHistory, THE BOSTON GLOBE Nov. 23, 2014).
Tucker recounts how during a time that some believed
criminals could be typified by his characteristics; this
type of profiling allowed each person to be represented
by a unique record.
to prevent recidivism and hasten enforcement
capabilities. 12
Fast forward to the current day, in which
we keep digital records of arrested individuals.13
Today law enforcement relies increasingly more
on digital databases that include photographs
captured by police surveillance cameras moni-
toring public places. 4 As will be discussed be-
low, the future of this technology is to combine
body-worn cameras with facial recognition ca-
pability. It has been reported that at least five
police departments in the country have the
ability to live-stream'" footage back to a central
server where facial recognition technology is
used to identify an individual in real time.'" As
stated above, the traditional use of body-worn
cameras thus far has been for accountability, so
as to settle accusations of misconduct by police
after the fact. Facial recognition technology soft-
ware will enhance the technology by adding the
ability to theoretically identify anyone an offi-
cer encounters. This capability creates an active
use of records or databases that traditional mug
shots did not. In its original iteration, the Ber-
tillon measurements were utilized to catalogue
charged suspects after the fact. Facial recogni-
tion technology gives police officers the ability
12 See Hodgeman c. Olsen, 86 Wash. 615 (1915); Shaffer c.
United States, 24 App. D.C. 417, 426 (1904).
13 Inmate Identification Photographs (Mugshots)," N.Y.
State Corrections and Community Supervision Direc-
tive. No. 4038 (Feb. 26, 2015), http://www.doccs.ny.gov/
Directives/4038.pdf>.
14 See Clare Garvie, Alvaro M. Bedoya, & Jonathan
Frankle, The PerpetualLine- Up; Unregulated Police Face
Recognition in America, GEO. L. CTR. ON PRIVACY & TECH.
(Oct. 18, 2016), https: www.perpetuallineup.org/sites/
default/files/2016-12/The%20Perpetual%20Line-Up%20
-%20Center%20on%20Privacy%20and%20Technolo-
gy%20at%20Georgetown%20Law%20-%20121616.pdf
" This paper uses the term live-stream to describe the
temporal aspect of the technology in question. Live-
stream refers to the real-time transmission of a video
as it occurs, allowing identification to happen while the
person may still be in the police officer's vicinity.
1 See id.
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to capture the photographic images of anyone
that passes the screen of their cameras wheth-
er they have been accused of a crime or not. In
addition, this feature essentially creates a geo-
graphical tagging of a person, essentially creat-
ing a record of where that image was taken.
In the wake of numerous instances of
fatal and egregious police brutality body-worn
cameras have been considered an important
method to ensure accountability of police offi-
cers and restore public trust in local police." In
addition to addressing issues of police miscon-
duct, the cameras also help police departments
to address systemic issues within their officer
corps.'" Some civil rights groups though have
warned that the ability of police to record in-
teractions with private citizens could also have
a myriad of negative consequences. 9 Some of
the most touted fears of police body cameras
include the threat of a chilling effect that re-
cording may have on First Amendment rights,
which could compromise any legitimizing ef-
fects. 2 0 For instance, footage could be leaked to
stigmatize the subjects of the video.21 In fact,
in a claimed effort to ensure unconditional ac-
countability, some police departments have al-
" See Jessica Tolliver, et al., Implementing a Body- Worn
Camera Program: Recommendations and Lessons Learned,
WASHINGTON, D.C. OFFICE OF COMMUNITY ORIENTED POLIC-
ING SERVICES (2014).
a See id.
1 See Jay Stanley, Body Cameras Should Not Be Lice-
Streamed, Am. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION (Jan. 29, 2016),
https://www.aclu.org/blog/privacy-technology/surveil-
lance-technologies/body-cameras-should-not-be-live-
streamed.
20 See Larry Greenemeier, Police Body Camera Use Not
a PrettyPicture, SCIENTIFIC Am. (Aug. 4, 2016), https:/
www.scientificamerican.com/article/police-body-cam-
era-use-not-a-pretty-picture/.
21 See Timothy Williams, Downside ofPolice Body Cam-
eras: YourArrest Hits You Tube, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 26, 2015),
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/27/us/downside-of-
police -body- cameras -your- arrest-hits -youtube.html. Se-
attle now has its own YouTube channel on which they
post all of their body camera feeds (it does blur faces).
ready made it policy to publish captured video
footage, excepting particularly sensitive footage
such as sexual assault.22
The concerns of body-worn cameras is
further complicated by the potentially immi-
nent combined technology of facial recogni-
tion.23 Several companies, including the giant
Taser, are actively developing software capabil-
ity that will link real time footage collected by
body cameras to cloud technologies using data
analytics. 24 The importance of this technology
cannot be understated. From a legal standpoint
capturing and analyzing any person's face may
imply that probable cause is no longer neces-
sary for a stop and search to occur.2 5 More spe-
cifically, if a police officer is able to identify you
by use of his body-worn camera, now linked
to a facial recognition database just by passing
you on the street, it may qualify as a search.26
It is important to also note that there are
benefits to the technology as well. Proponents
of this combined technology claim that facial
recognition technology in public places may
help locate missing persons or to satisfy a war-
rant.27 In 2014, the United States Department
of State successfully located a suspect who had
disappeared after a warrant was issued for his
arrest on charges of child abuse and kidnap-
22 See id.
21 See Press Release, Leadersh# Conference on Civil and
Human Rights, Civil Rights, Privacy, andMedia Rights
Groups Release Princ les for Law Enforcement Body Worn
Cameras (May 15, 2015), https:/civilrights.org/civil-
rights-privacy-and-media-rights-groups-release-princi-
ples -for-law- enforcement-body-worn -cameras/.
24 See Matt Stroud, Taser Plans to Livestream Police Body
Camera Footage to the Cloud by 2017,VICE (July 18, 2016),
https:/motherboard.vice.com/en us/article/ 4 xa4 3g/tas-
er-axon-police-body-camera-livestream.
21 See id.
26 See id.
21 See Garvie, supra note 14.
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ping.28 By running a facial scan of the suspect
through a database used to detect passport
fraud, officials located him living in Nepal un-
der an alias. 29 There are also ways in which the
technology may potentially resolve issues that
have not yet been widely addressed. Not very
long ago, the general guidance to law enforce-
ment officers was to remain in place during an
active shooter situation until reinforcements
arrived. 0 Today, police protocol in the United
States is transitioning toward instructions that
dictate arriving officers immediately enter the
scene of the shooting and work to mitigate ca-
sualties and collateral. 3 ' Using real-time tech-
nologies in such situations may open up the
ways in which active shooter or hostage scenar-
ios may be handled. In fact, similar guidance is
now also given to first responders and emer-
gency medical personnel, possibly hinting at
the future expansion of live feed video technol-
ogy. 32 Tragedies such as the 2016 shooting at an
Orlando nightclub offers an insight into which
having a remotely accessible view of the field
is critical for effective decision making in real
time. Though responding officers wore body
cameras, the footage has since been released
and it is apparent that the inability of the video
21 See Long- Time Fugitive Captured- Juggler Was on the
Run for 14 Years, FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION (Aug. 12,
2014), https:/ bi.gov/news/stories/2014/august/long-
time-fugitive-neil-stammer-captured/./>.
21 See id.
3o On September 23, 2016 several speakers, including
Paige Schilling of the New Jersey Office of Homeland
Security and Preparedness, at the Rutgers Institute for
Emergency Preparedness and Homeland Security col-
loquium entitled, "Homeland Security and Intelligence
for the Healthcare and Public Health Sector," spoke on
this subject in New Brunswick.
3 See Police Executive Research Forum, Critical Is-
sues in Policing Series: The Police Response to Active
Shooter Incidents (Mar. 2014), http://www.policeforum.
org/assets/docs/Critical Issues Series/the%20police%20
response%20to%20active%20shooter%20incidents%20
2014.pdf
32 See supra note 30.
to be live-streamed at the time of the shooting
was a critical missed opportunity.33 These types
of realizations may lead the technology toward
more robust and diverse uses.
The remainder of this paper will focus
on the legal implications of advances in body
camera technology that employs live stream
video footage and advanced facial recognition
technology. Because the technology is still be-
ing developed, the paper will suggest potential
uses and outcomes. For instance, such a capa-
bility could mean that anyone passing a police
officer equipped with the technology may be
scanned, identified, and catalogued in the fa-
cial recognition database, even without officer
interaction and in the absence of an alleged
crime.3 4 As many civil liberties groups have
maintained, this turns walking down the street
into a potential police interaction. 5 In fact, it
has recently been found that several cities used
body cameras to gather information on Black
Lives Matter protestors in order to create a
"watch-list."3 6 Short of the severe implications
of the First Amendment, as in the Black Lives
Matter allegations, the ability of law enforce-
ment to image and identify an innocent civilian
presents the potential for a Fourth Amendment
3 See Christopher Hayers, David Harris & Gal Tziper-
man Lotan, Deputies Release Body Cam Footage From
Inside Pulse, ORLANDO SENTINEL Nov. 10, 2016), http:/
www.orlandosentinel.com/news/pulse-orlando-night-
club-shooting/os-pulse-ocso-bodycam-20161 110-story.
html.
3 See Andrew Guthrie Ferguson,Big Data and Predic-
tive Reasonable Suspicion, 163 U. PA. L. REV. 327 (2014).
3 See Ava Kofman, Real-time Face Recognition Threatens
to Turn Cops'Body Cameras Into Surveillance Machines,
THE INTERCEPT, https://theintercept.com/2017/03/22/re-
al-time-face-recognition-threatens-to-turn-cops-body-
cameras-into -surveillance -machines/ (last accessed on
Apr. 30, 2017).
31 See Associated Press, 5 Black Lives Matter Protesters
Claim Bias, Sue Memphis, Graceland, NEW HAVEN REGIS-
TER 3 (Jan. 19, 2017), http://www.nhregister.com/nation-
world/article/5-Black-Lives -Matter-protesters-claim-bi-
as-sue-11315533.php.
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search. Courts have yet to analyze the consti-
tutionality of this nascent technology, largely
because it is not yet widely used, but courts
have traditionally grappled with how changing
technology affects expectations of privacy un-
der the Constitution.
Modern facial recognition technology is
an advanced adaptation of the Bertillon model,
and uses facial characteristics such as the eyes,
chin, cheekbones and nose to correlate what
are termed nodal points on a face. 8 Over time
the identifying characteristics constituting
nodal points are becoming more complex and
numerous. For instance, the New York State
Department of Motor Vehicles reported that af-
ter increasing the number of facial recognition
points used in license imaging from 64 to 128
points, the system has assisted in identifying
one hundred persons guilty of identification
fraud.39 Mapping out the face in nodal points,
called Principle Components Analysis, or aka
"Eigenfaces," is one of the more commonly
used methods of facial recognition technol-
ogy.40 In this analysis, the component extracts
are reduced to finite data points that are then
put into a template.4 ' This template can then be
used to search a database for a matching tem-
plate or face.42 There are countless databases
that may be utilized for this purpose, including
those developed by individual police depart-
3 See States c. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 285 (1983) (holding
that law enforcement tactics must be able to advance
with technology in order to prevent circumvention of
the law).
31 See Kimberly N. Brown, Anonymity, Faceprints, and the
Constitution, 21 GEORGE MASON L. REV. 15 (2014).
3 See David Kravets, EnhancedfDMVFacialRecognition
Technology Helps NY Nab 100 ID Thieves, ARs TECHNICAL
(Aug. 31, 2016).
40 See John D.Woodward, Jr.,Biometrics: A Look atFa-
cialRecognition, VA. STATE CRIME COMM'N & RAND CORP.,
8-9 (2003).
4 See Id.
42 See Id.
ments and state motor vehicle departments.4 3
In March, 2017, the federal government report-
ed that approximately one half of Americans'
facial data are stored in some facial recogni-
tion database.4 4 The FBI has reportedly run fa-
cial recognition searches against sixteen state
drivers' license databases, building a biometric
network that includes a myriad of non-crim-
inal entries.45 In addition, police officers may
request a search of the Federal Bureau of In-
vestigation's Next Generation Identification
database, which as of 2014, by itself contained
approximately 400 million facial images.4 6 At
this time, it is unclear whether a profile or re-
cord is created for each searched individual
(or created template), regardless of whether a
match is found. Such a use could essentially
create a footprint cataloging an individual's
movements and whereabouts over time based
on search records.4 1 Policy in this area has been
slow to follow the technology. Currently, there
is no state with comprehensive regulations on
how law enforcement can use facial recogni-
tion technology and the data that it compiles. 48
For instance, the Maricopa County Sheriff's
Office has entered all the drivers licenses and
mug shots of locally registered Honduran per-
sons into its database. 49 Similarly, its been re-
corded that the Pinellas County Sheriff's Of-
fice in Florida runs 8,000 monthly searches of
the state's drivers' license database, absent any
reasonable suspicion. 50 These frightening an-
43 See Garvie, supra note 14.
4 See U.S. House of Representatives Committee on
Oversight and Government Reform, Committee to
Review Law Enforcement's Policies on Facial Recog-
nition Technology, 2 (Mar. 22, 2017), https:/oversight.
house.gov/hearing/law-enforcements-use-facial-recog-
nition-technology/.
41 See Clare Garvie, supra note. 14.
46 See Kimberly N. Brown, supra note 38 at 188.
4 See Jay Stanley, supra note 19.
48 See Clare Garvie, supra note 14.
4 Id. at 4 .
o Id. at 4.
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ecdotes may be a small glimpse into a larger
misuse of public records.
Since 9/11, the desire to create and uti-
lize this technology has been growing and has
already played a large role in United States mil-
itary operations abroad. In 2012, the Depart-
ment of Homeland Security issued an assess-
ment update on a facial recognition technology
being developed as a stand-alone recognition
system for federal biometric cataloguing.' The
stated purpose of the research was categorized
as "advantageous technology to develop and
implement for national security purposes."52
The operative functioning component of the
technology exists in many places already, such
as social media platforms including Facebook
and Snapchat, which utilize nodal point recog-
nition to recognize faces.5 The images that may
be found in the databases accessed by law en-
forcement using this technology also includes
images obtained of persons at United States
border crossings, i.e. by Customs and Border
Protection. 4 Ultimately this assessment found
that the use of facial recognition technology
for large crowds produces a number of flawed
readings and matches, such as in a stadium or
Times Square. As will be addressed below,
this finding means that in order to capture a
"useable" image for the purposes of facial rec-
ognition scans, it is necessary to strategically
pair camera capability with compatible loca-
tion. This spatial strategizing may also hold
clues as to the constitutionality of capturing
and logging identities without cause.
" See U.S. Dep't of Homeland Security, Privacy Impact
Assessment Update for the Standoff Technology Integration
and Demonstration Program: Biometric OpticalSurveil-
lance System Tests, 2 (Dec.17, 2012).
52 Id.
5 See id. at 3.
5 See id.
5 See U.S. House of Representatives Committee on
Oversight and Government Reform, supra note 44.
Private companies are developing cam-
eras that will allow police to both transmit live
feed video and run it through facial recognition
software almost instantaneously.5s In addition,
a survey conducted by Johns Hopkins Univer-
sity has found that at least nine of the 38 com-
panies manufacturing body cameras already
have the facial recognition technology available
in their cameras.7 One company has begun to
work with local police on a pilot basis of its live
stream capabilities. 58 Another company based
in Arizona, called Iveda, owns a video surveil-
lance platform aptly titled Sentir.5 9 The Sentir
platform allows almost any network connected
technology, as elementary as a smartphone, to
stream live feed video to a number of locations
at once.o Similarly, Taser International has
been publicly heralding its plans to manufac-
ture facial imaging technology for nearly a de-
cade, and has previously announced it will have
the ability to live-stream body camera footage
to the cloud this year.6 ' Numerous companies
have advertised their work on this technology
16 See Ava Koffman, Real-time Face Recognition Threatens
to Turn Cops'Body Cameras Into Surveillance Machines,
THE INTERCEPT (Mar. 22, 2017), https:/theintercept.
com/2017/03/22/real-time-face-recognition-threatens-to-
turn-cops-body-cameras-into -surveillance-machines/.
" See Vivian Hung, Jacqueline Coberly, & Steven
Babin, A Market Survey on Body Worn Camera Technolo-
gies, Nat'l, NAT'L INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE. Doc. No. 250381
(Nov. 2016).
" See Matt Stroud, The Company That's Livestreaming
Police Body Camera Footage RightNow,VICE MOTHER-
BOARD (July 27, 2016), https:/motherboard.vice.com/en
us/article/9a3ddv/visual-labs-police-body-camera-lives-
tream.
" See Sentir Cloud Video Surveillance Management
Platform, Iveda, https://www.iveda.com/sentir/ (last
accessed Mar. 15, 2017).
60 The term virtually indestructible comes from the
Iveda website. The website states that once the video is
captured it is immediately transferred to the cloud and
the loss/destruction of the camera will not compromise
the video content.
61 See Stroud, supra note 58.
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and will likely hasten the entrance of this prod-
uct to police departments across the country. 62
There are also many prohibitive factors
to this technology spreading too quickly, in-
cluding financing, connectivity and transmis-
sion speeds, body camera battery life, and data
storage capability.'6 For instance, the platform
"Evidence.com" which houses and manages
footage generated by Taser body cameras cur-
rently holds an amount of data reported to be
comparable to the whole of Netflix's streaming
catalog.6' Further, footage must be maintained
to meet the standards for admissible evidence,
which further increases the price and need for
sizable data storage.65 In 2015 San Diego paid
roughly $500 per camera to outfit its officers
with body-worn cameras, but must pay $1,495
per camera per year to simply house the foot-
age.6 6 Similarly, Los Angeles pledged $57.6
million dollars to outfit its 7,000 officers with
body cameras; however, due to the prohibitive
price, they still had not received the cameras as
of 2016.67
62 Companies which has also recently publicized
their research include Digital Ally, www.digitalallyinc.
com,> and WatchGuard, www.watchguard.com; See also
Weisse, supra note 12.
63 See Eric Markowitz, PoliceDepartments Face A Crucial
Question: How To Pay For Body Cameras?, INTERNATIONAL
BUSINESS TIMES (May 12, 2016), http://www.ibtimes.com/
police-departments-face-crucial-question-how-pay-
body-cameras -2366968. Markowitz reports that police
body cameras can range from $300 to $800 per officer
(before storage and streaming). It's indicated that Los
Angeles negotiated a contract for cameras for 7,000
officers at a price of $57.6 million over five years. The
mayor of Philadelphia has enacted a sugary drink tax to
defray costs.
6 See Weise, supra note 12.
6 See id.
6 See Eric Markowitz, supra note 63.
6 See id.
EXISTING POLICY
Body worn cameras, even without the fa-
cial recognition add-on, have dismally low ley-
els of regulation.68 In a Brennan Center for Jus-
tice study, researchers found that Baltimore is
the only city police department that has a poli-
cy on the biometric search of footage collected
by body cameras. 6 9 The same study found that
about half of the departments surveyed have no
policy on the ability of police to record First
Amendment activity, with a handful prohibit-
ing recording for uses of surveillance or iden-
tification. 0 Though the technology is widely
used, states are only beginning to require that
regulations govern body camera use. Interest-
ingly, some states, such as Minnesota, have leg-
islated that local police departments must de-
velop individual policies, rather than legislate
a state-wide policy." Similarly, New Jersey has
adopted standards which require that police de-
partments using body cameras have a policy in
place, but regard more details beyond founda-
tional state guidelines to be the purview of the
department itself 72 In fact, New Jersey award-
ed police departments across the state with
$2.5 million in grants for the purchase of 5,000
6 See Greenemeier, supra note 20.
69 Brennan Ctr. Center for Justice. Privacy and First.
Amendment Protections (July 8, 2016), https://www.bren-
nancenter.org/analysis/police-body-camera-policies-pri-
vacy-and-first-amendment-protections. In a study of 23
police departments, Brennan Center used a scorecard
of four factors to rate the regulations of body worn
cameras. The study also then matched policies against
model policies.
70 Id.
7 Jonathan Young, LocalLa w Enforcement Plans For
Body Cameras, STILLWATER GAZETTE (Dec. 16, 2016),
https://www.hometownsource.com/stillwater gazette/
news/government/local-law-enforcement-plans -for-
body-cameras/article e42ee484-d2c5-5049-b457-4ddb-
1de55884.html.
7 See Directive No. 2015-1 from N.J. Office of Atty Gen.
(July 28, 2015).
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body worn cameras." This brought the number
of departments in New Jersey using cameras
up from 50 departments to 200 departments. 4
Ostensibly, one may presume that the result is
nearly 200 different sets of departmental pol-
icies and protocol on the use of body-worn
cameras. Where policies exist, they include the
amount of time footage can be held, how it is
stored, and protocols to obtain footage for legal
purposes. 5 As of the end of 2016, no state had
passed a law that places comprehensive limits
on the use of facial recognition technology by
law enforcement. 6 The piecemeal approach
has led to loopholes in policy and a lack of clar-
ity on what police officers may and may not do
in regards to facial recognition technology. As
the next section will address, this may leave the
courts as the final arbiter of setting a Fourth
Amendment standard over the use of real time
facial recognition searches.
In addition to camera technology, it is
also important to have policies in place for the
use and maintenance of facial recognition da-
tabases. The FBI currently has Memorandums
of Agreement with eighteen states on the use
of their driver registration databases in order
to pursue facial recognition searches." The im-
" Attorney General Offers OverHalfa Million Dollars
in New Grant Funds to Help NJ Police Dep'ts Buy Body
Cameras, DEP'T L. PUB. SAFETY OFF. ATT'Y GEN. (Sept.
20, 2016), http://www.nj.gov/oag/newsreleasesl6/
pr20160920a.html.
7 Id
"Police Body Camera Policies: Privacy and FirstAmend-
mentProtections, BRENNAN CTR. JUST (July 8, 2016.) https:/
www.brennancenter.org/analysis/police-body-cam-
era-policies -privacy- and -first-amendment-protections.
In a study of 23 police departments, Brennan Center
used a scorecard of four factors to rate the regulations
of body worn cameras. The study also then matched
policies against model policies.
6 Clare Garvie et al., The PerpetualLine-up: Unregulated
Police Face Recognition in America, GEO. L. CTR. ON PRIVA-
cy & TECH. 1, 59 (2016).
7 U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Over-
sight and Government Reform. Committee to Review Law
plications of this type of information sharing
arrangement are staggering. While it means
that data are being used by entities beyond
the original receiver of the information, it also
means that non-criminal persons are being
searched in connection with potential crim-
inal investigations. The databases held by the
FBI are constituted by eighty percent of people
with non-criminal records, such as incidentally
obtained photos that include work identifica-
tion photos and drivers license photos." The
Georgetown Law Center on Privacy & Technol-
ogy performed a study of thirty states' drivers
license records policies.7 9 Its results show that
of the 245,273,438 adults in the United States,
117,673,662 adult drivers are in a "law enforce-
ment face recognition network." 0
Regulation is also necessary to protect
the integrity of the data being collected."' It has
been shown that fingerprints, like any other
type of personal, identifiable information can
be stolen in electronic hacks.82 This also applies
to facial recognition data. 3 Without the proper
regulation of this technology it is easy to imag-
Enforcement's Policies on FacialRecognition Technology,
Before the H Comm. on Oversight and GoQ'tReform, 115th
Cong. 2 (2017) (statement of Jason Chaffetz, Chairman,
United States H. Comm. on Oversight and Gov't Re-
form).
" Adrienne Lafrance, Who Owns Your Face?, THE ATLAN-
TIC. (Mar. 24, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/technol-
ogy/archive/2017/03/who-owns-your-face/520731/.
" Garvie, supra note 76 at 3.
so 8
" See generally Clare Garvie & Jonathan Frankle, Facial
Recognition Software Might Have a RacialBias Problem,
THE ATLANTIC (Apr. 7, 2016).
82 See Kaveh Waddell, When Fingerprints Are as Easy to
Steal as Passwords, THE ATLANTIC. (Mar. 24, 2017) https://
www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2017/03/
new-biometrics/520695/.
" Id Waddell writes that researchers at the University
of North Carolina designed a 3D replica of a person's
head by inputting their facial recognizable data into a
3D printer. They reported that the model when animat-
ed was so accurate that it tricked "four out of five facial
recognition tools they tested."
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me that its decentralized storage and usage
protocol may make it vulnerable to hacks and
theft by foreign agents, criminal enterprises or
individual criminals." In addition to the pro-
prietary nature of facial images, it is important
that the technology works accurately. In March
of 2017, the U.S. Government Accountability
Office stated in testimony before congressional
committee that the FBI had not taken previous
instruction to improve the accuracy of its facial
recognition technology. 5 One unheeded rec-
ommendation included the need to ensure that
external databases used by the FBI were not in-
cluding the images of innocent persons. 6 Even
more troubling, the facial recognition tech-
nology available today consistently finds false
positives in its searches and matches of African
American persons."' In 2012 a study in Florida
compared several vendors' software and found
that the findings were five to ten percent more
likely to fail in searches of African American
subjects." Though the National Institute of
Standards and Technologies has reported that
its regular testing every four years has shown
rapid advances, any amount of false positives
along the lines of a protected group is a prob-
lem with massive implications. 89
84 I.
8 Face Recognition Technology, DOJ and FBINeed to Take
AdditionalActions to Ensure Privacy andAccuracy, U.S.
Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFE. (Mar. 22, 2017), https://www.
gao.gov/products/GAO-17-489T.
86 Id.
8 Garvie, supra note 81.
88 Id
89 Id
FOURTH AMENDMENT USES
AND PROHIBITIONS
Existing case law has consistently held
that visual surveillance on its face is not a
search per the Fourth Amendment. 90 This line
of cases builds on the traditional logic that an
object easily observed by the naked eye with-
out a physical intrusion into a person's home
does not constitute a search. Taken to its log-
ical end this is appropriate. The alternative
would be infeasible, for instance banning po-
lice officers from observing their surroundings.
This was the standard for some time, following
Olmstead v. United States.9' Therefore, if this
standard still applied, live streaming alone via a
police body camera may not pose any threat of
violating the Fourth Amendment. However, the
Court later revisited the issue with the advent
of more advanced surveillance technology.92 In
Katz v. United States, the court scrapped Ol-
mstead, holding that the Fourth Amendment
does not require that a person's property be
invaded upon but that the expectation of priva-
cy is connected to the individual.93 Therefore,
the use of a body worn camera able to live-
90 Florida c. Riley, 488 U.S. 445 (1989); Dow Chemical Co.
c. United States, 476 U.S. 227 (1986); Calfornia c. Ciraolo,
476 U.S. 207, 213 (1986) (holding that it'd be unreason-
able to hold out visual observation as a search, which
would "require law enforcement officers to shield their
eyes when passing by a home on public thorough-
fares").
9 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928) (finding
that the wiretapping of a man did not violate the Fourth
Amendment because no search and seizure occurred,
defining a search to have meant his home was entered;
instead the information was collected by the listening
ear of a police man) (overturned byKatz c. UnitedStates,
389 U.S. 347 (1967)).
92 Robert C. Power, Technology and the Fourth Amend-
ment: A Proposed Formulation for Visual Searches, 80 J. OF
CRIM. L. AND CRIMINOLOGY. 1, 12 (1989.).
" Katz c. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 352 (1967) (holding
that the wire-tapping of a public phone booth used by
the petitioner constituted a search under the Fourth
Amendment).
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stream a person's image without consent or
person-to-police interaction may constitute a
search under Katz. As will be discussed below,
the addition of a facial recognition technology
further complicates this analysis.
The Supreme Court has held that a vi-
sual search of the exterior of a home is not a
violation of the Fourth Amendment protection
against privacy. However the use of technology
for an external search has been addressed dif-
ferently.94 An increase in the use of technology
for law enforcement searches has forced judges
to discern when technology may change what a
visual search looks like in Fourth Amendment
analysis. Namely, in 2001 the Supreme Court
held that the use of thermal imaging technol-
ogy constituted a search of a person's home,
even when used from the outdoors.95 The dis-
tinction made by the Court hinged on the use
of a particular technology by police officers,
rather than the information that the technol-
ogy collected or how it was collected. 96 I will
refer to this first approach to a simple visual
search as "The Kyllo Test."
In this case police officers suspected
defendant Kyllo of growing marijuana in his
Oregon home. 97 Police officers used a thermal
imaging device to monitor the heat emanating
from the exterior of his home, assuming that
this may indicate growing lamps for the mari-
juana plants.9 8 The Court held that the thermal
imaging information gleaned about a house
was a violation of Kyllo's reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy.99 The Court makes clear that
1 See also Florida c. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 452 (1989)
(holding that aerial photographs of a house and sur-
rounding area isn't a search.)
'1 Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 35 (2001).
96 Id.
97 Id.
" Id
9 Id
this technology did not penetrate the walls or
windows of Kyllo's home and was not a search
in the traditional sense, however through the
use of technology the police were able to learn
information about the interior of a protect-
ed place.' 00 The Court found that because the
technology is not in general public use, Kyllo
had a reasonable expectation that thermal tech-
nology would not be used in monitoring the
thermal footprint of his home.' 0 ' Therefore, the
Court held that a warrantless use of technology
unavailable to the public will likely constitute
a search as its unavailability makes it an unex-
pected intrusion. The holding states that, "the
Government uses a device that is not in general
public use, to explore details of a private home
that would previously have been unknowable
without physical intrusion, the surveillance is a
Fourth Amendment "search," and is presump-
tively unreasonable without a warrant."' 02 This
approach rests on the Fourth Amendment stan-
dard posited by Justice Harlan in his famous
concurrence in Katz. He found that in order
for a Fourth Amendment protection to exist, a
person must have an actual expectation of pri-
vacy, and that expectation must be reasonable
as viewed in terms of contemporaneous socie-
tal standards.'03 Certainly a person has the right
to privacy when in his home. Kyllo takes this
standard another step to the use of technology
for gleaning information from a home without
physical entry.104 The Court reaches the conclu-
sion that if a form of technology is not widely
available, using that technology to penetrate
the walls of a protected place constitutes an
100 
.
101 Id
102 Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 31-41.
10' See also Bond c. United States, 529 U.S. 334, 338 (2000)
(holding that a person must exhibit an "actual expecta-
tion of privacy")").
104 Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 31-41.
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unconstitutional search even where entry was
never physically established.105
Applying the Kyllo Test to streaming live
video of a private citizen's face on the street,
it is unclear how courts may come down on
Fourth Amendment searches. Applying the first
requirement of the test, that a person can be
easily viewed when on a public street is obvi-
ous and it is clear they have no general expecta-
tion of privacy. Courts have held that some risk
to privacy is assumed when persons subjects
themselves to public scrutiny. 106 If courts apply
only the first part of the test, the live stream
feature of body cameras to facial recognition
may not be considered a Fourth Amendment
violation. However in using the court's logic in
Kyllo, one may argue that the addition of facial
recognition technology in real time may consti-
tute a search due to the advanced technology
inherent in its use. While passing through an
airport may negate the expectation of privacy of
identity, when walking down the street the av-
erage person does not have the expectation that
their identity is being registered in real time. As
suggested in Kyllo, the average person does not
have access to this technology and therefore
would not assume that their neighbors and
other passers-by do either. Therefore, as long
as the technology remains relatively apart from
general consumption, the average citizen may
" Ian Hardy, How ThermalImaging Tech is About to
Become Hot Stuff, BBC Bus. (Dec. 11, 2015) ("As tech-
nology becomes more affordable and subsequently
more accessible, courts will be required to look at the
Kyllo Rule for the reasonableness of its continuation
and make distinctions about how accessible negates an
expectation of privacy.").
106 See United States c. White, 401 U.S. 745 (1971) (holding
that an undercover informant using a concealed wire
did not constitute a search, as the person assumes the
risk that his conversant will share the information); see
also Calfornia c. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 40 (1988) (hold-
ing that the search of a person's trash once discarded is
not a search).
make the argument they have an expectation of
privacy in their facial identity.
In looking at the airport caveat to priva-
cy, the concept of public spaces has been gen-
erally blurred. If we accept a theory of "private
spatialization," in which a location may confer
a "sphere" or "zone" of privacy, the next step is
to evaluate if and how privacy may exist in pub -
lic.' 7 For instance, if a parking garage has 24-
hour surveillance, a person utilizing the garage
for parking understands they are being filmed,
but they do not expect that the tapes serve any
purpose other than the real-time monitoring
of potential crime. They may further assume
that after a reasonable period the tapes are
destroyed if no incident requires their extend-
ed retention. However if the tapes are used to
monitor and identify an individual who is not
committing a crime, it is no longer a legal use
of surveillance under the Fourth Amendment.
The spatialization of privacy requires that the
Fourth Amendment analysis compare the use
and context of a search, and properly frame
the reasonability of an expectation of privacy
in public. Though not explored in this paper,
the dichotomy of self-exposure and privacy in
online public forums requires a similarly spe-
cific analysis.' 8o This nuance also applies to fa-
cial recognition technology's use in public. The
Supreme Court has addressed private spatial-
ization tangentially. The Supreme Court held
in 2013 that "the scope of a license - express
or implied - is limited not only to a particular
area but also to a specific purpose."' 09 Though
o' Julie E. Cohen, Privacy, Visibility, Transparency, and
Exposure, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 181, 190-92 (2008).
10s Id. at 197-98. ("using the analogy of online presence
and the ability to expose herself to certain forums, but
also expect differing levels of privacy depending on the
forum to explain "networked space.").
10. Florida c. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409, 1416 (2013)
(holding that a police officer's use of a sniffing canine
on the porch of a person's house was a trespass of their
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relying on the traditional concept of a search as
a physical intrusion, the Court is maintaining
that there is a societal expectation that there
is a limit to how far a search may be extended.
This is illustrated in the parking garage exam-
ple. Rather than address the physical, Kyllo dis-
tinguishes known technology from unknown,
or unavailable technology, drawing the veil of
privacy at the borders of public awareness and
accessibility. The idea that a person may expose
herself to public scrutiny, but not to unknown
forms of surveillance, is an important distinc-
tion. The Court has held that physical features
or characteristics that a person knowingly ex-
poses to the public, including facial and vocal
features, are not protected under the Fourth
Amendment." 0 Therefore, in combining these
standards, courts may hold that body-worn
cameras are not a search, but that transmitting
images for unexpected facial identification is
unconstitutional.
Kyllo distinguishes public visual surveil-
lance from the added use of technology. Aca-
demics further suggest that a particular public
context may govern whether the use of known
technology violates a reasonable expectation
of privacy. For instance, the use of a legal fa-
cial recognition apparatus often relies on what
is termed a "face trap.""' Practitioners and ex-
perts of the technology consider a face trap to
be the circumvention of a recognized inability of
cameras to align with lighting and the angle of a
property, though external to the dwelling, as it exceed
the reasonable expectations of what a search entails).
11 United States c. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 14 (1973) (holding
that a person does not have a reasonable expectation
of privacy in those physical characteristics that are
constantly exposed to the public, such as one's facial
characteristics, voice, and handwriting.); see also United
States c. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976).
" Woodward, supra note 40, at 14. (describing inade-
quacies of facial recognition technology such as poor
lighting or a face being held at an angle that don't allow
for an accurate scan)
person's face in certain instances. Therefore, by
controlling the conditions of the 'face trap' and
manipulating the camera, the ability of the cam-
era to capture an accurate image increases.11 2 An
example of this is surveillance cameras placed
at the top of escalators where people are sta-
tistically most likely to be looking while riding.
By aligning the camera with the escalator's an-
gle and overhead lighting, it is statistically more
likely a usable image will be captured. Applying
the above contextualization argument of pub-
lic settings to technology per Kyllo standards,
live streaming of images into a facial recogni-
tion software may at times constitute a search.
It should be noted, the constant advances in
technological innovations require that the Kyllo
standard be fluid. Public places are increasingly
more "wired" with security technology and this
causes the argument for an expectation of priva-
cy to fade proportionately." 3
The Mosaic Theory
In recent years courts have begun to ap-
ply the "Mosaic Theory" to Fourth Amendment
challenges of technology and surveillance. This
section will describe the underlying reasoning
behind the Mosaic Theory and apply it to the
use of live-stream facial recognition technology
in the context of policing. Distinguished from
the Kyllo Test, the Mosaic Theory posits that it
is not the context and technology of the search,
but the aggregation of its findings that may con-
stitute an unconstitutional search. While the use
of a body-worn camera itself may be legal, and
possibly even the identification feature of facial
112 d
113 Lauren Young, The Hidden Security Bugs in Archi-
tecture ThatYou NeverNoticed, ATLAS OBSCURA (June 24,
2016), https://www.atlasobscura.com/articles/the-hid-
den -security-bugs -in-architecture-that-you-never-knew-
about details (detailing the way in which many public
places are built to be advantageous for security and
surveillance collection).
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recognition technology under the Mosaic Theo-
ry, it is the use and storage of the data that cre-
ates an illegal search. As previously discussed,
if body-worn cameras may transmit images that
are searched in real time, the storage of that data
is capturing distinct individual movements that
aggregate into a broader record of movements.
For instance, if a person passes a police officer
every Thursday on her way to the doctor, and
we are assuming that the officer is scanning her
image in a facial recognition database causing a
record to be made of each search, there is then
too a record of her Thursday trips to the doctor.
This type of tracking may constitute a search.
Because actual protocol is not available, it is
conceivable that if no record is created, and per-
haps she is not surveilled in the way the Mosaic
Theory posits. This section will ultimately argue
that while facial recognition technology as ap-
plied to police body-worn cameras even if itself
constitutional under the Fourth Amendment,
the effect of the data collected may constitute a
search under the Mosaic Theory.
The Mosaic Theory was initially posited
by the D.C. District Court in U.S. v. Maynard.
The Maynard Court held that searches may be
analyzed "as a collective sequence of steps rath-
er than as individual steps."" 4 This would apply
to the accumulation of data, such as making a
record of a person's weekly trip to the doctor.
The Supreme Court subsequently addressed
the issue of aggregate data as a trespass. In Jus-
tice Sotomayor's concurrence to Justice Alito's
majority opinion in U.S. v. Jones, she coins the
aggregation of data a mosaic of data aggrega-
tion." 5 The Court's holding in Jones declined
114 Orin S. Kerr, The Mosaic Theory of the Fourth Amend-
ment, 111 MIcH. L. REV. 311, 313 (2012) (quoting United
States c. Maynard, 615 E3d 544 (D.C. Cir. 2010)).
" United States c. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 953 (2012) (hold-
ing that people have an expectation that their public
movements on a street remain private).
to follow an earlier decision that held the use
of a radio tracking devices attached to a car was
not a search if transmissions were only utilized
by police while the car was on public thorough-
fares." 6 Instead, Justice Sotomayor argued that
the use of a GPS device affixed to Jones' car
for the tracking of his movements amounts to
a search specifically due to the length of time
and sophistication of the data, versus the more
remedial technology as was used in Knotts."
Justice Sotomayor further elaborated
that the ability of a police officer to observe the
movement of a car at any given isolated point is
different than the police monitoring where the
person travels at all times, potentially in real
time." In the lower court, D.C. Circuit Judge
Ginsburg held that while a single movement
within the period of the car's tracking may be
observable to the public, it is unlikely that any
individual observing the car in public will ob-
serve the entirety of its travels for an extend-
ed period, creating a reasonable expectation
of privacy in consecutive travels." 9 Therefore,
while traveling on public roads is not private
information per se, the accumulation of data on
an individual gathered by a constant monitor
violates the expectation of privacy of that per-
son. 20 The Court went so far as to call the four
week tracking of Jones' car as a "dragnet."121 In
dicta, Justice Alito stated that even without the
act of trespass, the sum of the data collection
may amount to an intrusion on a person s priva-
cy even if the constituent aspects of the search
"6 United States c. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 281-82 (1983)
(holding that while use of a [GPS] by police was valid
when the car was on public roads still made transmis-
sions from within the plaintiff's home a search).
"' See United States c. Maynard, 615 E3d 544, 568 (D.C.
Cir. 2010).
118 United States c. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012).
". Maynard, 615 E3d at 560.
120 United States c. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 416 (2012) (Soto-
mayor, J., concurring) (citation omitted).
121 Id. at 412, 409 (citations omitted).
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itself do not.'22 Justice Sotomayor's concur-
rence stated that the accumulation of private
information about a person, such as tracking
a person for an extended amount of time, will
inherently reveal personal and private informa-
tion such as "familial, political, professional, re-
ligious and sexual associations."'23
In 2014 the Supreme Court seemingly
adopted and applied the Mosaic Theory in Ri-
ley v. California.1 24 Though the theory was not
invoked by name, the Court used a similar anal-
ysis to come to a conclusion on the aggregation
of private data and found that the accumula-
tion determines what will constitute a search.
The Court held that the general tenets of the
theory apply based on the specific items to be
searched incident to an arrest, specifically a cell
phone on which large quantities of data are de-
posited. Justice Roberts stated that police may
search a cigarette box in an arrested individu-
al's pocket,1 25 however it would be a violation
of the Fourth Amendment to search that per-
son's cell phone.1 2 6 The Court's argument rests
on the distinction that the amount of private
data that a phone may hold about a person
will nearly always be incriminating in some
way.1 27 The opinion states that the "privacies"
of a person's life are carried around with him
on his cell phone but that makes them no less
private or deserving of protection than physi-
122 Miriam H. Baer, Secrecy, Intimacy, and Workable Rules:
Justice Sotomayor Stakes Out the Middle Ground in Unit-
ed States c. Jones, 123 YALE L.J. E 393, 394 95 (Mar. 24,
2014).
121 Jones, 565 U.S. at 415.
124 Riley c. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2493 94 (2014).
121 Id. at 2483 (citing United States c. Robinson, 414 U.S.
218, 234-35 (1973) (distinguishing the Court's holding
that the context for a search weighed against the police
officer's safety is a case by case analysis and is less com-
patible with cell phone searches).
126 Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2493.
121 Id at 2492.
cal records.128 Though the Court takes the ap-
proach that a case-by-case analysis is necessary
when determining whether a cell phone search
is proper, it is clear that the Court's approach
toward the protection of aggregated material
is shifting toward a more mosaic-like under-
standing. If this approach continues to near the
spatialization theory, the Court may bridge the
gap from private aspects of the physical world
to private nontangible items within the Fourth
Amendment context.
Analogizing the data accumulated by
facial recognition technology to the use of a
GPS device on a car reaches the same conclu-
sion. Though a person may expect to be seen
when walking down the street and potential-
ly recognized, his expectation is likely that law
enforcement will not identify and record his
image. Further, if the technology is applied
in this manner, it is wholly unlikely a person
expects the cumulative collection of data cap-
tured by facial recognition to create a record
of his movements. Therefore, courts apply-
ing the Mosaic Theory will likely find the use
of facial recognition technology of persons in
public who are not interacting with the po-
lice, to constitute a search. 29 The use of facial
recognition technology is further complicated
by the fact that under the Mosaic Theory we
must distinguish between matters of depth and
matters of breadth. The distinction is between
large amounts of information on an individu-
al or a small amount of information on many
people. With such advanced technology it is
feasible that both forms of data collection are
121 Id. at 2494 95.
121 United States c. Skinner, 690 F.3d 772, 780 (2012)
(holding that "situations where police, using otherwise
legal methods, so comprehensively track a person's ac-
tivities that the very comprehensiveness of the tracking
is unreasonable for Fourth Amendment purposes").
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present in this type of surveillance.13 0 Scholars
have described this phenomenon as an "ag-
gregation effect," which relies on a massive
amount of information about a person or per-
sons to piece together a larger and more broad
set of information.' 3 ' Though the public un-
derstands law enforcement's ability to conduct
limited searches under reasonable conditions,
the accumulation of personal data that in es-
sence forms a record of a person's movements
outside a criminal investigation would be un-
reasonable by current standards.1 3 2 Despite de-
veloping technology, the public trend has been
moving toward an expectation that a person's
movements over time are private and consid-
ered highly personal. 3 3
Because facial recognition technology is
still in its infancy it is hard to know how ex-
actly a facial scan and search will be obtained,
used, stored and handled. In addition and as
previously discussed, regulation of this tech-
nology is based on scant law and policy, which
130 Id. at 787. Baer posits that there are two types of
data collection: one in which a huge amount of data is
collected on one person (such as Jones), and the other
in which a lesser amount of data is collected on a large
number of people; Baer,supra note 122, at 396.
131 Daniel J. Solove, THE DIGITAL PERSON: TECHNOLOGY
AND PRIVACY IN THE INFORMATION AGE 44 (2004). In this
piece Solove compares the finite pieces of data collect-
ed by technology to the pointillism style of a Seurat
painting contributing to a larger picture.
132 See Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 177 78 (1984)
(citation omitted) (holding that the limit to searches
under the Fourth Amendment must be linked to what
society "understand [s]" to be the bounds of its privacy).
133 Hanni Fakhoury, Hanni and & Jennifer Lynch, EFF
Fights Government's Effort to Get CellLocation Records
Without a Warrant, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND DEEPLINKS
(Nov. 18, 2014), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2014/11/
new-eff-brief-explains-why-cell-phone-location-re-
cords-are-private-and-government (citing a Pew Re-
search Center study published in 2014 that stated "82%
of Americans consider the details of their physical
location over time to be sensitive information more
sensitive than their relationship history, religious or
political views, or the content of their text messages.")
exists entirely at the state and municipality lev-
el. Therefore, it is not known whether a cam-
era will constantly be filming and identifying
or whether it will be used for specific persons
or searches. Likely this will vary across depart-
ments. As argued above, for police officers to
actively scan anyone they encounter on the
street without reasonable suspicion or initiat-
ing a conversation, will likely be held as a viola-
tion of privacy under the Fourth Amendment.
However under the Mosaic Theory, such a find-
ing requires broad generalizations about the
processing of data and assumes that it will be
compiled into a record and accessed at will. It
is feasible that the proper use and regulation
of facial recognition databases may protect the
use of live-stream technology against violations
of privacy.
The most obvious counterargument to a
violation of the Fourth Amendment found un-
der the Mosaic Theory relies on the Third Party
Doctrine. The Third Party Doctrine posits that
when a third party maintains information as a
result of a business transaction, it can keep the
information as long as it is private and not used
for another purpose. 1 In order to apply this ar-
gument to the discussion of facial recognition
technologies, we must assume that the databases
are managed by third parties and that the pub-
lic is put on notice that their images are being
collected.'3 At this point in the development of
pairing live-stream body cameras with facial rec-
ognition technology, there is a two-step process.
The first step requires that the video be live-
streamed to somewhere.'3 6 As of right now, the
134 Orin S. Kerr, The Case for the Third-Party Doctrine,
107 Mich. L. Rev. 561 (2009).
135 Id
136 Brennan Center for Justice. "Police Body Camera
Policies: Retention andRelease, N.Y. UNIV. SCH. OF L. (Aug.
3, 2016), https://www.brennancenter.org/analysis/po-
lice-body-camera-policies-retention-and-release> (last
visited on Apr. 30, 2017).
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majority of technologies are developing stream-
ing capabilities to the cloud.' 7 Assuming this is
the case, the images captured are transmitted in
real time to a location that may be maintained
by the software company.' 8 The second step re-
quires that the image be run through the facial
recognition database of choice against existing
records for a match.1 39 Law enforcement main-
tains their own databases but also pulls in re-
cords from external databases.'40 As discussed
above, some databases, such as that maintained
by the FBI and state departments of motor ve-
hicles, are external parties that require a request
by the police department. 141 Matches in the ex-
ternal database will trigger notification to the
police department. 42 It is possible protective
measures such as warrant requirements may
be implemented to further bolster the consti-
tutionality of this type of information sharing.
131 Weise, Karen, Will a Camera on Evey Cop Make
Eveione Safer? Taser Thinks So, BLOOMBERG BUSINESS
WEEK (July 12, 2016) https://www.bloomberg.com/news/
articles/2016-07-12/will-a-camera-on-every-cop -make-
everyone- safer-taser-thinks -so.
13' Also possible that it could be the police department,
but as previously stated the expense of maintaining
footage is exorbitant
1 Garvie, supra note 76.
140I 
.
141 Karen Weise, Will a Camera on Evey Cop Make
Ev'eione Safer? Taser Thinks So, BLOOMBERG BUSINESS
WEEK (July 12, 2016), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/
articles/2016-07-12/will-a-camera-on-every-cop -make-
everyone- safer-taser-thinks -so (currently some third
parties provide storage platforms, albeit with a hefty
price tag. For instance, vendors such as Taser utilize a
platform called Evidence.com, to store the information
collected by body worn cameras).
142 This paper does not consider the circumstances by
which a warrant would be necessary for these records,
and assumes that based on agreements with the data-
base holder and the level of probable cause necessary,
it will vary by circumstance. For instance, the New York
Times reported in "Downside of Police Body Cameras:
Your Arrest Hits YouTube," previously cited, that one of
the bigger issues with footage retention is the cost and
availability of subpoenaed records the ACLU tried to
get footage from the Sarasota PD and they claimed it'd
cost $18,000 for 84 hours of film
For the Third Party Doctrine to apply, this would
require that the database of images is not held
by the police department and requires formal
requests for access to records. Though not yet
decided in connection with live-stream, facial
recognition searches, there is analogous prece-
dent in the courts. According to a Fifth Circuit
Court ofAppeals case decided in 2013, the Third
Party Doctrine allows for extended record keep-
ing when a third party retains the information
for a business purposes and does not share it
with other parties.' 43 Specifically, the court held
that cell phone records retained by the cellular
provider are akin to business records, and as
such the cell provider is the possessor of the re-
cords with the blessing of the cell phone user.'4
Therefore, the court concluded that it was not a
violation of the Fourth Amendment for agents
to obtain court orders for records under the
Stored Communications Act. 45 Though the case
was later overturned on procedural grounds, it
laid the groundwork for issues of cellular data
under the Fourth Amendment, and for applica-
tions of the Third Party Doctrine.4 6
The Third Party Doctrine nearly saves
the constitutionality of this type of surveillance.
However the court goes on to specify that the
Third Party Doctrine does not apply when a
143 See In Re: Application of the United States ofAmerica
forHistorical CellSite Data, No.724 F.3d 600 at 15 (5th
Cir. 2013) (overturned on procedural grounds) (holding
that "where a third party collects information in the
first instance for its own purposes," the government
can later obtain that information for law enforcement
purposes if a subpoena or appropriate order is used);
See also Oregon Prescrition Drug Monitoring Program c.
DEA, 998 E Supp. 2d 957 (D. Ore. 2014) (holding that a
patient's prescription records are stored by the store, a
third party, when held in a database).
144 Id.
145 Id.
141 Somini Sengupta, Warrantless Cellphone Track-
ing is Upheld, N.Y. TIMES (Jul. 30, 2013), http://www.
nytimes.com/2013/07/31/technology/warrantless-cell-
phone-tracking-is-upheld.html.
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person is not knowingly giving that information
to a third party.'4 'Therefore the issue remains
as to whether a person may be expected to re-
tain privacy of their face against identification
and tracking when in public. The Sixth Circuit
has held that when a person is engaged with
a business, for instance a financial institution,
those records are the property of the bank as a
party to the transaction and are obtainable by
a third party. (CITE) This is distinguished by a
situation such as letter carried by the postman;
though the post office has temporary posses-
sion of the letter, the contents of the letter only
concern the sender and the receiver and the
post office is not a party to the transaction. 48
Applying this standard, a court may find that
an individual having a conversation with a po-
lice officer may be subject to legal facial rec-
ognition scanning, whereas a person walking
down the street alone and never encountering
the officer may have a reasonable expectation
of privacy.1 4 9 Courts have not addressed wheth-
er an interaction with a police officer makes
the expectation of privacy against a facial rec-
ognition search constitutional. However, facial
recognition technology has already been em-
ployed in stationary surveillance cameras in
1 In Re: Application of the United States ofAmerica for
Historical Cell Site Data, 724 E3d 600 (2013) (citing
Reporters Comm. for Freedom ofPress c. Am. Tel. & Tel.
Co., 593 E2d 1030, 1043 (D.C. Cir. 1978)); distinguished
by SEC v. Jerry T O'Brien, Inc., 4 67 U.S. 735, 743 (1984)
(holding that "when a person communicates informa-
tion to a third party even on the understanding that the
communication is confidential, he cannot object if the
third party conveys that information or records thereof
to law enforcement authorities.").
141 See United States c. Warshak, 631 E3d 266, 288 (6th Cir.
2010) (distinguishing an "intermediary" between a party
to the transaction).
149 See also United States c. Forrester, 512 E3d 500, 511
(9th Cir. 2008); United States c. Phibbs, 999 E2d 1053 (6t'
Cir. 1993) (holding that the manner in which informa-
tion is obtained by law enforcement informs whether or
not it was obtained by illegal search).
some cities.15 0 Applying the logic in Kyllo, if
the technology becomes ubiquitous in public
places and a person's ability to walk down the
street anonymously is no longer a reasonable
expectation, it is foreseeable that the Third Par-
ty Doctrine could save the constitutionality of
the live-stream facial recognition and storage
of that information. Another approach may
be that used by Moscow's law enforcement,
which pairs facial recognition technology with
thelOO,000 public CCTV cameras around the
city.' 5 ' However Moscow scans only databases
that include criminals and missing persons,
unlike the civilian records searched by FBI and
local law enforcement in the United States.1 52
Obviously, it is hard to know whether addition-
al data is mined for the Russian program, but
if it does in fact utilize only criminal databases,
it may lessen the impact of such a search and
provide a model to replicate.
RECOMMENDATIONS
The practical and important uses of fa-
cial recognition technology are obvious. The
ability to link an officer's position in a high risk
situation with a live feed to a secure location
would be an incredible benefit to public and
officer safety, such as an active shooter or hos-
tage situations. Further, uses such as the abil-
ity to locate missing persons and children will
bolster the legitimate use of a constant stream-
1"0 Karen Weise, Will a Camera on Every Cop Make Ec-
eryone Safer? Taser Thinks So, BLOOMBERG BUSINESS WEEK,
July 12, 2016), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/
articles/2016-07-12/will-a-camera-on-every-cop -make-
everyone- safer-taser-thinks -so (this report details the
program used by the Los Angeles Police Department
as the only department actively using this technology.
However, the authors further hint to the use of this
technology by undisclosed departments, evidenced by
contracts made with certain manufacturers of the tech-
nology).
151 jj.
152 Id
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ing feature. However as discussed above there
are multiple hurdles to the constitutional use
of this technology. This section will briefly list
some recommendations for the proper and le-
gal use of live-stream facial recognition tech-
nology paired with police body cameras.
First and foremost, policies need to be
in place governing the use of this technology.
There is a worrying lack of regulation on the
use of body cameras alone, before even adding
the ability to live-stream the footage. This must
be remedied before the technology is advanced
any further. The need to protect citizens' rights
is as important as keeping officers safe and ac-
countable, and to allow the technology to ex-
ceed its value is extremely dangerous. While
it appears unlikely that a uniform structure of
regulation will occur nationally, state laws will
provide ample notice to police departments on
rights of citizens captured by the body-worn
cameras. Further, while federal regulation
may be unlikely, there is little chance that fed-
eral courts will not rule on matters of Fourth
Amendment rights as they apply to body cam-
eras. Therefore, courts will need to begin work
on a legal standard that can help to create a
more uniform set of guidelines as a way to in-
form state and local policies on developing sur-
veillance technology.
Second, law enforcement and technolo-
gy providers must come together to determine if
live-streamed images will be catalogued, where
they will be held, and the proper procedure for
accessing the data. Similar to the way in which
the FBI has Memorandums of Understanding
with state and local partners around the shar-
ing of databases, law enforcement should be
transparent about the use of shared databas-
es.153 In addition, private companies developing
this technology may be critical in informing the
public as to the capabilities of the technology,
as well as the contracts it creates with law en-
forcement entities. As discussed above, the ac-
cumulation of data secured by body-worn cam-
eras may in theory begin to construct a digital
footprint of anyone whose image is captured by
the cameras. To fully protect rights according
to the Mosaic Theory, data must be stored in
such a way that law enforcement cannot use or
access it to violate privacy. Further, it must be
protected against unlicensed disclosure.
Lastly, there must be notice to the public
that their images may be captured and identi-
fied in public. The notice is a requisite to any
security against unconstitutionality conferred
by the Third Party Doctrine. Further, notice
is a necessary requirement to overcoming the
reasonable expectation as set out by Katz. This
paper has argued the reasons for each of the
above recommendations, and now argues fur-
ther that each of these recommendations pro-
vides extra protection for both law enforcement
and the public. Through regulation and third
party involvement there is added accountabil-
ity and security for all parties. Further, the no-
tice given to the public not only protects their
rights, but adds additional deterrence against
potential criminal acts.
CONCLUSION
As discussed above, law enforcement is
relying increasingly more on technology. There
are clear benefits and needs for policing to keep
up with technological developments and to uti-
lize all the tools available. However as with any-
thing, it is necessary to implement regulations
and policy on the use of such powerful tools.
This is especially true with the unique capabil-
ities of facial recognition technology.
153 Id.
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As argued by this paper, facial recogni-
tion technology is a critical component of our
law enforcement and security apparatus in the
United States. But its use by law enforcement
in a real time, public setting may also consti-
tute a search. Because public places are less
likely to afford an expectation of privacy, courts
must look to the technology itself In looking to
the technology, courts must discern the ways
in which collecting any private information re-
quires the storage and continued use by law
enforcement. It is likely that collecting such
myriad information on individual persons will
constitute a record of that person and there-
fore result in a search.
Lastly, law enforcement has the duty to
protect this information once collected. As has
been recently disclosed by the United States
government, most American citizens can be
found in at least one of the numerous databases
held by government entities. Even further, most
of those entries are compiled with non-crimi-
nal records. In the context of a criminal search
the use of private citizen's information from
sources such as drivers license databases high-
lights the necessity of protecting non-criminal
records against incidental searches without
proper protective measures.
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